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Judicially Fusing the Pinkerton Doctrine
to RICO Conspiracy Litigation
Through the Concept of Mediate Causation
Dean Browning Webb'
INTRODUCTION
T HE Pinkerton' Doctrine is a rule of criminal conspiracy law. Though
Pinkerton is associated with and has been invoked in criminal
prosecutions, the doctrine has seemingly found its way into civiP Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO) conspiracy
litigation
i The author specializes in complex RICO litigation with emphasis on application of
the Pinkerton Doctrine in RICO conspiracy. James N. Gross, Esq., of Philadelphia, PA, and
the author represented plaintiffs in the RICO conspiracy case of Smith v. Berg, 247 F3d 532
(3d Cir. 2001). A member of the Civil RICO Report Advisory Board, the author publishes
extensively upon RICO conspiracy law and the Pinkerton Doctrine, as well as addressing
RICO aiding and abetting issues. Willamette University College of Law, J.D. 1976, New York
University Graduate Tax Program, 198 1. Former staff attorney, 1978 House Select Committee
on Assassinations. The author expresses sincere appreciation and recognizes the contributions
and efforts to this Article by Orlando Rodriguez, pursuing the studying of pre-law courses
at Hunter College, New York City. The author extends recognition to James M. Jennings,
III, Articles Editor, for his significant contribution and helpful comments in regard to the
review and revision process of this article. The author dedicates this article in perpetual
loving memory to Juretta Elizabeth Oliver (Nov. 10, 1929-June 25, 1993). The author also
dedicates this article in perpetual loving memory to his brother, Robert R. Webb (Mar. I,
1963-Mar. 25, 2009).
2 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 651 (1946).
3 See Susan W. Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious
Liability in Civil RICO Actions, 81 Ky. L.J. 369, 388 (1993); Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and
Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. REV. 931, 1013
(1991).
4 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orgnizations Act of 1970 (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-I968 (2oo6). Section 1962(d) proscribes conspiring to contravene any provision of
§ 1962. Outsiders and lower echelon employees who fail the operation and management
test for participation in the enterprise under § 1962(c) may nonetheless be liable as
co-conspirators under § 1962(d): "there is no rule requiring the government to prove that
a conspirator knew of all criminal acts by insiders in furtherance of the conspiracy ... [t]o
be convicted as a conspirator, one must be shown to have possessed knowledge of only the
general contours of the conspiracy." United States v. Zichettello, zo8 E3d 72, ioo (zd Cir.
2000) (holding § 1962(d) does not require that defendant take part in managing or directing
enterprise's affairs); See Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 E3d 961, 967 (7th Cir.
zooo) (holding § 1962(d) does not require that defendant agree personally to participate in
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This Article examines the evolution of the Pinkerton Doctrine, reviews
and analyzes particular federal RICO decisions construing Pinkerton,
and advances malleable, practical arguments supporting its successful
invocation in civil RICO conspiracy litigation. The Article includes an
analysis of the concepts of "mediate causation" and "affiliative liability"
for purposes of rationally justifying the application of Pinkerton, concluding
that the Pinkerton Doctrine is judicially appropriate and legally cognizable
to advancing both civil RICO conspiracy claims and the underlying RICO
Liberal Construction Clause.5
I. THE PINKERTON DOCTRINE, AFFILIATIVE LIABILITY, AND THE CONCEPT
OF MEDIATE CAUSATION
A. Introduction
Understanding the Pinkerton Doctrine requires a factual review. Walter
and Daniel Pinkerton, two brothers, were indicted for both substantive
and conspiratorial offenses arising from evading federal liquor taxes. 6 The
Supreme Court reviewed the case because the jury was instructed that
it could convict the Pinkertons of all substantive offenses committed to
further their conspiracy.7
Upholding the instructions and sustaining the convictions, Justice
Douglas concluded that the brothers were affiliated within a conspiracy
when the offenses were committed.8 Justice Douglas's cogent analysis is
both compelling and persuasive. Concluding that a conspiracy is essentially
tantamount to a "partnership in crime," Justice Douglas espoused the
the operation and management of an enterprise, but to "knowingly agree to perform services
of a kind which facilitate the activities of those who are operating the enterprise in an illegal
manner"), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1243 (zooo); United States v. Castro, 89 F3d 1443, 1452 (I ith
Cir. 1996) (holding Reves "operation and management" test does not apply to convictions
under § 1962(c)). But see Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., Io8 E3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding liability attaches under § 1962(d) where a defendant conspires to operate or
manage an enterprise, but not where the defendant conspires with someone who is operating
or managing an enterprise) overruled in United States v. Fernandez, 388 E3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2oo4) (relying on Smith v. Berg, 247 F3d 532 (3d Cir. 2001)). Thus, a defendant not guilty of
the substantive offense may still be convicted of conspiracy if there is proof of an agreement
to commit the substantive crime. See, e.g., Smith v. Berg, 247 E3d 532, 538 (3d Cir. zool)
(holding defendant could be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO even though he could
not be charged with committing a substantive predicate act).
5 See 18 U.S.C. § i964(c) (2oo6).
6 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.
7 See id. at 642, 645 n.6. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, this was critical to Daniel
because Walter committed the substantive offenses while Daniel was incarcerated. Id. at 648
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 646-47 (majority opinion).
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Pinkerton Doctrine.9 The Doctrine recognizes that because members of a
conspiracy are "partners in crime," they are liable for acts taken by their co-
conspirators in furtherance of their joint criminal purposes. 10 The depth
and scope of the judicial treatment underpinning this analysis is cogently
analyzed and thoroughly reviewed by a preeminently11 recognized leading
authority and proponent that vigorously advocates both recognition and
application of Pinkerton in the civil RICO conspiracy context:
Justice Douglas based this doctrine on two sources-a rule of proximate
causation and a rule of complicity among co-conspirators. In dissent,
Justice Rutledge contended that the majority's use of the rule of complicity
among co-conspirators abrogated the historic principle that in criminal law
guilt is "personal, not vicarious." But even before Pinkerton, participation
in a conspiracy could establish liability for crimes committed by other
conspirators; this was simply a means of proving complicity, and Justice
Douglas derived his Pinkerton holding from this rule of complicity among
co-conspirators. The major difference between the two doctrines is that
under Pinkerton, membership in a conspiracy gives rise to a presumption of
aiding crimes committed to further the goals of that conspiracy, while under
the older rule membership was evidence of complicity but did not give rise
to a presumption."2
Pinkerton can thus be characterized as a rule of conspiracy law recognizing
affiliative liability. The act of mutually agreeing to the commission of
offenses is considered to have an independent causal significance that
justifies holding one who agrees to a conspiracy liable for its intended
results.13 This observation is especially compelling when considering
application of Pinkerton to civil RICO conspiracy pleading:
This act [affiliating with another for a criminal purpose] satisfies the criteria
for imposing accountability under the traditional criminal law standard
of personal liability: affiliating with another for criminal purposes is a
voluntary act committed with a culpable mental state, or mens rea, that
causes a prohibited social harm. In either of its guises, as Pinkerton liability
or as complictious liability, this act is clearly more culpable than the act
that suffices for imposition of vicarious liability in civil law ... The only
element of criminal liability that is attenuated under Pinkerton is causation,
which receives the same treatment accorded it under the kindred doctrine
of accomplice liability. Liability can attach under either form of affiliative
liability without showing that the affiliative act actually caused commission
9 Id. at 644.
1o Id. at 651-52 (Rutledge, J. dissenting). The Pinkerton Doctrine meant that Daniel was
liable for the substantive offenses committed by Walter during Daniel's incarceration. Id.
i i See Brenner, Civil Complicty: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in
Civil RICO Actions, supra note 3, at 385.
12 Id. (footnotes omitted).
13 Id.
2oo8-2oo9]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of certain crimes. And because the affiliative act is a wrong in itself, liability
can attach even though the target crime was not accomplished. 4
Affiliative liability is, therefore, judicially recognized and appropriately
applicable to ascribe Pinkerton liability to RICO co-conspirators whose
offense is consummating the illegal agreement to contravene RICO
substantive provisions." Brenner's expos6 on the application of Pinkerton
aptly reveals that "guilt by association" is in fact a viable legal instrument
for RICO conspiratorial liability:
Instead of abrogating "the need for a personal actus reus" as an element of
liability, the Pinkerton doctrine holds a party liable for the consequences of
a specific personal act-affiliating with another for criminal purposes. This
act permits imposition of liability for crimes committed by those with whom
one shares such a relationship. The non-acting party is liable for these
offenses because her criminal act of allying herself with the acting party
"caused" them to be committed.' 6
No rational justification militates against employing Pinkerton in
the RICO conspiratorial context. 7 Its invocation is consonant with
advancing the liberal construction of RICO to eradicate innumerable
forms of racketeering activity and to reach those perpetrators who occupy
conspiratorial capacities who do not actually commit the underlying
substantive criminal offenses."8
Significant within this analysis is Brenner's observation that the concept
of "mediate causation" is a recognized factor in situations in which one's
acts are deemed to have "mediately caused" an effect upon another's
conduct. 19 The result is the imposition of criminal liability that comports
with traditional requirements by including the element of demonstrable
personal fault:
'Mediate causation' denotes instances in which an individual's actions can
be deemed to have exerted some causal effect upon another's conduct. It
resolves the problem of attempting to identify the extent to which one
person's acts actually affected another's conduct by making it possible,
under certain circumstances, to assume a causal effect that is sufficient to
support imposition of criminal liability.
2 0
14 Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to
RICO Actions, supra note 3, at 963-65.
15 Id. at 963-64, 968-78.
16 Id. at 953-57, 961-62 (footnotes omitted).
17 See id. at 956-7, 961-62.
18 See 18 U.S.C § 1964(c)-(d) (2oo6).
19 Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO
Actions, supra note 3, at 963-65.
20 See id. at 974-75 nn.189-9o (emphasis added) (Brenner cites to "mediate" as an
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"Mediate causation" and "affiliative liability" are terms evolved from
Pinkerton that can support the invocation of the Pinkerton Doctrine in civil
RICO conspiracy litigation practice. As discussed below, Pinkerton's analysis
melds appropriately into civil RICO conspiracy.
B. Comprehending Pinkerton
To comprehend Pinkerton and its impact, an examination of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the RICO conspiracy provision is
warranted. The Supreme Court construed the RICO conspiracy statute's
application and construction in Beck v. Prupis,2 l a civil RICO conspiracy
decision. Beck lays to rest the conflicting positions of the federal courts
relative to the necessary pleading requirements of a civil RICO conspiracy
claim by conflating § 1962(d) and the "by reason of" § 1964(c) proximate
causation requisite."2 The judicial fusion of these two provisions is
intended to achieve uniformity by extending the strictures of Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corporation3 to civil racketeering conspiracy by
requiring the commission of an overt act that proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries.14
Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Thomas arrived at this conclusion
by invoking the law of civil conspiracy.2" The judicial expressions the Court
relies upon in supporting its decision presumed the rational justification
belying proximate causality engrafted upon RICO civil conspiracy,
distinguishing civil relief from criminal RICO conspiracy prosecutions. 6
The vigorous dissent of Justices Stevens and Souter critically assailed
the majority's reasoning through civil conspiracy law as misguided and
denounced the Court's foisting the "by reason of" requirement of §
1964(c) upon § 1962(d) as inappropriate when examined in the context of
congressional intention underlying the enactment of RICO. 7
Beck is perilously inapposite with the Court's decision in Salinas v.
United States.1 Salinas construed racketeering conspiracy by introducing a
rigid, inflexible demarcation line between RICO criminal conspiracy under
§ 1962(d), where criminal liability attaches without the need to prove that
antonym for immediate). See, e.g., WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1526 (2d ed. unabr. I934) (mediate denotes "an intervening cause ... not direct or
immediate").
21 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000).
22 Id. at 5o6-7; see 18 U.S.C. § 962(c)-(d) (2006).
23 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (I992).
24 See Beck, 529 U.S. at 500.
25 Id. at 495-96.
26 Id. at 504.
27 Id. at 507-1 2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
2008-2009]
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a defendant committed an "overt" act. Here, the Court held that in the
RICO conspiracy context, all that must be shown is that a conspirator
intended to "facilitate or further" an endeavor which, if completed, would
satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, and that the
conspirator agreed to pursue the same criminal objective, or adopt the
objective of "furthering or facilitating" the criminal endeavor.2 9 Under
general conspiracy law, which Salinas says applies to § 1962(d),30 in order
to be liable under RICO concepts, one does not have to agree personally
to perform every aspect of a violation and, in particular, one does not need
to agree personally to commit the predicate offenses, let alone commit an
overt act. The conspiracy springs from the agreement to pursue the same
criminal objective and the work may be divided up among the conspirators,
yet each is responsible for the acts of the others. The lower courts have had
difficulty in applying the law as set forth in Salinas to civil cases despite the
lack of any legislative intent to treat civil cases differently in any way from
criminal cases.
Since the Salinas ruling, federal courts continue to struggle with its
application to civil RICO conspiracy claims. The resulting decisions
are confusing and inconclusive. Moreover, Salinas follows the Pinkerton
Doctrine, recognizing its application to criminal RICO conspiracy practice
and procedure.31 To further understand the logical relationship between
Pinkerton and its application to civil racketeering conspiracy claim pleading,
a review of the doctrine and Salinas, juxtaposed with the concept of
"mediate causation," supports advancing Pinkerton to civil RICO conspiracy
claim pleading and practice.
C. Salinas3"
Salinas, a RICO criminal conspiracy prosecution, involved a deputy
sheriff who was acquitted of the underlying substantive RICO offenses
but was convicted of the RICO conspiracy crime under § 1962(d). The
defendant argued that his § 1962(d) conviction could not be sustained
unless the prosecution proved that he personally agreed to commit two
predicate offenses and actually committed those offenses in furtherance of
the conspiracy.33 Examining the legislative intent of the RICO statutes and
general conspiracy principles, the Court summarily rejected defendant's
argument, concluding:
29 Id. at 63-64; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2oo6).
30 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64.
31 Id. at 63-64.
32 Id. at 52 (1997).
33 Id. at 6i
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A conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would
satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices
that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor. He
may do so in any number of ways short of agreeing to undertake all of the
acts necessary for the crime's completion.m
The Court held that to be convicted of a RICO conspiracy a person
must agree with other individuals that they will engage in conduct that
constitutes a crime.35 The purpose of the conspiratorial agreement is to
facilitate the commission of a crime, and a particular defendant need not
perform all of the criminal acts.36 All a RICO conspirator need do is agree
to support a criminal objective to further an endeavor which, if completed,
would satisfy all of the elements of a criminal offense.37 Doing so does not
require the conspirator to agree to commit or facilitate each and every part
of the substantive offense.38
Salinas clarified the pleading and practice standard for criminal RICO
conspiracy prosecutions. However, the lower courts have been slow to
accord deference to the reasoning of Salinas in the civil RICO conspiracy
context, and it appears that the several federal circuits will continue to
attempt to construe and apply Salinas narrowly in the civil arena. The
Ninth Circuit appropriately commented in both Chang v. Chen39 and Neibel
v. Trans World Assurance Co. 40 that there is no reason in the civil RICO
context to differentiate between the statutory basis of a civil and a criminal
RICO case, and, accordingly, a civil RICO conspiracy claim should survive
the dismissal of the § 1962(c) substantive claims, regardless whether or not
34 Id. at 65.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Chang v. Chen, 8o F3d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1996).
4o Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., io8 F3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997).
2oo8-zoo9]
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it is a criminal RICO 4' or a civil RICO case. -4 The lower courts' difficulty
with consistently applying conspiracy requirements in a civil context in
the same manner as applied to conspiracy in a criminal context may result
from unsupported judicial antipathy towards the use of RICO in a civil
context, without adequate jurisprudential basis to distinguish between
the identical legislative basis for both. Part of the problem in consistent
application of the law to civil and criminal RICO conspiracy claims may
also lie in the practical necessity in the civil context to show an injury,
which almost always coincides with an overt act even though Salinas makes
it clear that an overt act is not necessary for a RICO conspiracy conviction.
43
Perhaps the problem in consistent application is that inchoate crimes, such
as conspiracy, are sometimes difficult to translate conceptually into the civil
context, even though the legislative language is straightforward and clear
in decreeing that conspiracy is one of the four bases for civil and criminal
41 The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Fernandez, 388 E3d 1199, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004),
finally adopted Smith v. Berg, 247 F3d 532 (3d Cir. 2001) as the correct rule of RICO conspiracy
law, thereby overruling Neibel to the extent its previous analysis required participatory
involvement in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise to justify ascribing RICO
conspiratorial liability. Fernandez, one of six consolidated appeals involving federal RICO
conspiracy and related RICO issues, affirmatively overruled the Ninth Circuit's earlier ruling
in Neibel io8 F3d at 1123, addressing RICO § 1962(d), as inapposite and inconsistent with
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court authorities construing that provision as expressed in Salinas,
522 U.S. at 52, and Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (zooo). More importantly, the Ninth Circuit
recognized Neibel's legal reasoning rested upon an earlier Third Circuit decision, United States
v. Antar, 53 E3d 568, 581 (3d Cir. 1995), and thatAntarwas overruled by a latterThird Circuit
decision, Smith v. Berg, which squarely addressed RICO conspiracy law in light of Salinas and
Beck. Fernandez, 388 E3d at 123o. Affirming the RICO conspiracy convictions, the Ninth
Circuit expressly announced:
We now agree with the Third Circuit that the rationale underlying its
distinction in Antar, and our holding in Neibel, is no longer valid after
the Supreme Court's opinion in Salinas. Accordingly, this case presents
a situation similar to Millerv. Gammie, in which we held that "where the
reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable
with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-
judge panel should consider itself bound by the later and controlling
authority, and should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been
effectively overruled." We adopt the Third Circuit's Smith test, which
retains Reves' operation or management test in its definition of the
underlying substantive § 1962(c) violation, but removes any requirement
that the defendant have actually conspired to operate or mange the
enterprise herself. Under this test, a defendant is guilty of conspiracy to
violate § 1962(c) if the evidence showed that she "knowingly agree[d]
to facilitate a scheme which includes the operation or management of a
RICO enterprise."
Smith, 247 E3d at 538 (citation omitted).
42 Fernandez, 388 3d at 1229.
43 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63-64.
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RICO liability. Yet, the applicability of the Pinkerton Doctrine is appropriate
in civil RICO conspiratorial context. 44
D. Beck"
1. Majority Opinion.-The Beck Court's majority opinion perfunctorily
reviewed RICO generally and then proceeded to analyze § 1962(d)'s
applicability in terms of civil conspiracy and proximately caused injury.
Certiorari issued because of inconsistent positions between the federal
circuits construing the racketeering conspiracy provision in the limited
factual context of whistle-blower standing:
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on
the question whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a
conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under § 1964(c) for a
violation of § 1962(d) even if the overt act does not constitute "racketeering
activity." The majority of the Circuits to consider this question have
answered it in the negative. Other Circuits have allowed RICO conspiracy
claims where the overt act was, as in the instant case, merely the termination
of employment, and was not, therefore, racketeering activity.46
The Court then summarily concluded that the resolution of the issue
revolved upon the agglomerated effect of § 1962(d) and § 1964(c).47 Then,
inexplicably, the Court literally fused the combined statutory amalgamation
in the context of civil conspiracy law, requiring that an injury arise from
the commission of an overt act in connection with the RICO conspiracy. 4
In turn, that "act" is required to be an "act" statutorily identified under
RICO:
4 9
The principle that a civil conspiracy plaintiff must claim injury from an act
of a tortious character was so widely accepted at the time of RICO's adoption
as to be incorporated in the common understanding of "civil conspiracy." We
presume, therefore, that when Congress established in RICO a civil cause
of action for a person "injured ... by reason of" a "conspir[acy]," it meant to
adopt these well-established common-law civil conspiracy principles. 0
44 See United States v. Yannotti, 457 F.Supp. 2d 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Pinkerton
applied to RICO criminal conspiracy prosecution).
45 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000).
46 Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 503.
49 I8 U.S.C. § i96i(i)(A)-(E) (20o6).
50 Beck, 529 U.S. at 504 (citations omitted). See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 252 (3d
ed. 1969) ("It is the civil wrong resulting in damage, and not the conspiracy which constitutes
the cause of action."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (4th ed. 1968) ("[Wlhere, in carrying out
the design of the conspirators, overt acts are done causing legal damage, the person injured
has a right of action.").
2008-2009]
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Supported by its construction of civil conspiracy case law, the Court
concluded that relief arising from a RICO conspiracy claim must be
proximately attributable to the commission of an "overt act" specifically
identified by the RICO statute.-' Any "overt act" not statutorily listed
under RICO precludes the required standing to advance such a claim.5"
2. The Dissenting Opinion: Judicial Implausibility.-Justice Stevens penned
the Beck dissenting opinion. Joined by Associate Justice Souter, the dissent
astutely and constructively criticized the majority's misplaced reliance
invoking civil conspiracy law to premise its decision requiring proximate
causality as a condition precedent to RICO conspiracy standing and
correlative recovery. 
53
The Justices similarly distended the majority's citations to the numerous
federal and state decisional authorities that purportedly supported their
opinion to judicially fuse § 1962(d) and § 1964(c), requiring a proximately
caused injury emanating from an "overt act" listed under RICO's
"racketeering activity" provision:
The plain language of RICO makes it clear that petitioner's civil cause of
action under [§1 1964(c) for a violation of [§] 1962(d) does not require that
he be injured in his business or property by any particular kind of overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court's recitation of the common law
of civil conspiracy does not prove otherwise, and, indeed, contradicts its
own holding.'
The analysis embodied within the dissenting opinion accurately and
correctly states the proper and intended construction and application of
the RICO conspiracy provision. Beginning with the basic premise that
the "plain language" of RICO does not compel a person to condition
recovery under § 1962(d) by demonstrating an injury proximately caused
by an "overt act," i.e., a form of racketeering activity, the invoking of civil
conspiracy law is, indeed, judicially implausible.55
The dissent's cogent analysis is terse yet significant. No one need
look beyond § 1962, which contains four alternative bases of prohibited
activities.5 6 Melding § 1964(c) to the former does not ipso facto accord a
51 Beck, 529 U.S. at 505.
52 Id.
53 The dissenting opinion cites Salinas at footnote i, paraphrasing, in part, that
"[a]lthough, '[tihere is no requirement of some overt act' to violate §1962(d) that, of course,
does not mean that an agreement alone gives rise to civil liability under § 1964(c)." Id. at 507
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
54 Id. at 512.
55 Id.
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2oo6).
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claim for relief under the latter.5 7 To adopt the Majority's position, § 1962(d)
would be rendered mere surplusage, which Justice Thomas accentuated
was in fact not intended."8
II. PINKERTON PRECLUDES APPLICATION OF REVES V. ERNST & YOUNG
Pinkerton similarly forecloses invocation of Reves v. Ernst & Young 9 in
the RICO conspiracy context. Though professionals such as attorneys and
accountants have advanced Reves as an argument to obviate RICO conspiracy
liability exposure, such efforts have produced inconsistent results. In fact,
Reves has engendered intense debate, and a review of conflicting judicial
positions illustrates the judicial exacerbation experienced by litigants.
Reves is a stringently construed rule essentially created to benefit
professionals who find themselves embroiled in RICO litigation based on
the mere rendition of perfunctory services, as long as they do not "conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs." '  Reves has generated contentiousness and increased judicial
activity that otherwise would have been silenced.6' Federal courts have
increasingly construed Reves to apply, or not apply, in a myriad of differing
factual contexts. Disposition of most of those RICO actions where Reves
is invoked is achieved on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
and the federal courts have exhibited a growing eagerness to jettison such
actions through the federal summary judgment instrument.6 A developing
57 Beck, 529 U.S. at 506.
58 Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
60 Id. at 172.
6i See G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its
Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiraty Liability Under
RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345 (Special Ed. 1996).
62 See Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 178 F3d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1999) (Bear
Stearns did not exercise, or agree to exercise, some measure of control over the corporations;
it was merely a hireling as shown by fact that it only received its normal fee for determining
a client's fair market value); Goren v. New Visions Int'l, Inc., 156 E3d 721, 727-28 (7th Cir.
1998) (outsider's performance of services for illegal corporate enterprise is not enough to
incur liability under Reves, even if outsider's role is critical to success of fraudulent scheme);
Webster v. Omnitrition Int'l, Inc., 79 F3d 776,789 (9th Cir. 1996) (attorney whose role as officer
of corporation was purely ministerial in nature not liable for making statements allegedly
promoting pyramid scheme); Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F3d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1993) (attorney's
involvement in alleged limited partnership fraud scheme was too limited and sporadic to
satisfy Reves); Stone v. Kirk, 8 E3d 1079, 1091-92 (6th Cir. 1993) (salesman of joint venture
interests who did not play any part in directing venture's affairs did not sufficiently participate
in operation or management of enterprise that he could not be held liable for violating anti-
fraud provisions of federal securities laws in connection with his sale of interests); Madanes
v. Madanes, 981 F. Supp. 241, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allegations that attorney knowingly
concealed fraudulent activities of enterprise of enterprise and recommended certain courses
of fraudulent behavior are insufficient to establish § 1962(c) liability); Bowdin Constr. Corp.
2oo8-2oo9]
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body of positive federal case law refusing to apply Reves in traditional
professional liability based RICO actions signals an increasing revulsion
v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 869 F Supp. 1004, ioo9 (D. Mass. 1994) (dismissing claims
under Reves against law firms which, with full knowledge of fraud, counseled their clients to
continue to participate in the fraudulent transactions and to conceal them from detection
by their victims); Nolte v. Pearson, 994 Ezd 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Reves to
affirm directed verdict in favor of defendant law firm); Univ. of Md. at Baltimore v. Peat,
Marwick, Main and Co., 996 E2d 1534, 1538-4 o (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of RICO
count against accounting firm despite egregious misconduct by the firm; merely performing
materially deficient financial services for an insurance company does not amount to directing
the insurance company's affairs); and, Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 E3d 512, 521 (2d Cir.
1994) (individual who merely acted as an attorney for the other defendants, who had no role
in the conception, creation or execution of the alleged flip or assignment, could not be liable
under Reves).
[Vol. 97
MEDIATE CAUSATION
and recognized antipathy towards its perceived' blanket immunization
policy.,
63 Significant is the increasing trend of other federal courts to depart from the harsh
application of Reves and examine it upon an individual fact-specific basis regarding no
professional "outsiders." These judicial expressions warrant serious consideration in
connection with re-examining Reves. See LSJ nv. Co. v. O.L.D., Inc., 167 F3d 320,324-25 (6th
Cir. 1999) (suggesting that controlling shareholder's power to direct operation or management
of the enterprise is sufficient); Aetna Cas. & Sur/ Co. v. P&B Autobody, 43 F3d 1546, 1559-60
(ist Cir. 1994) (jury could find that autobody shop defendants exerted some control over
Aetna-the enterprise-by causing corrupt Aetna appraisers to approve false claims, thereby
directing some aspect of the enterprise's affairs); Davis v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York,
6 F3d 367, 380 (6th Cir. 1993) (insurance company exercised sufficient control over affairs
of the enterprise even if it is not liable based on its agent's control of the enterprise), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1193 (1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1542 (ioth Cit.
1993) (sufficient evidence supported jury finding that officers of parent company controlled
operations of affiliate reseller of automobile notes); Toucheque v. Price Bros. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d
341,348 (D. Md. 1998) (when lower level employees are involved, nothing in Reves limits RICO
liability to those who commit predicate acts at the express direction of upper management;
if such employees are generally under the supervision of higher management, they are liable
even if upper management neither knew nor approved of the employees' racketeering
activities); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. io76, 1o99 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (unions played
a management role in that they participated in the development and implementation of
fraudulent scheme to file false workman's compensation claims and coordinated scheme by
directing their members to take certain actions to carry it out); Edison Elec. Inst. v. Henwood,
832 F. Supp. 413, 416-17 (D.D.C. 1993) (outside contractors exercised control of plaintiff
company through its bribed employee who was paid kickbacks to approve false invoices);
Brown v. LaSalle N.W. Nat'l Bank, 8zo F. Supp. 1078, io8z (N.D. Ill. 1993) (bank had sufficient
control over fraudulent scheme that omitted provisions in loan documents); National Org.
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, No. 86-C-7888, 1997 WL 61o782 at *io (N.D. I1l. Sept. 23,
1997) (RICO enterprise may be operated by upper management, lower rung participants
who are under upper management's direction, "or others associated with the enterprise who
exert control over it"); and, In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation, No. CV-87-3574 RSWL
(C.D. Calif. Oct. 26, 1994) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (non-managing underwriters of
public securities offering had sufficient influence over the underwriting syndicate to satisfy
the Reves standard). Butsee Tonnemacherv. Sasak, 859 E Supp. 1273, 1275 (D. Ariz. 1994), where
an outside accounting firm engaged in a fraudulent scheme to obtain money by deception
through the issuance and sale of limited partnership units. The district court found that
the firm did not participate in the operation or management of the enterprise (the hiring
partnership); it was, therefore, not liable under § 1962(c): "[wlhether accounting services are
performed competently or incompetently, properly or improperly, is irrelevant to the Reves
analysis." Id. at 1276. The court similarly found no liability under § 19 62(d), but properly
noted that "if the Plaintiffs can establish that [the accounting firm] intended to participate
in a RICO conspiracy, [it] may be liable under 1962(d) regardless of whether [it] committed
the substantive RICO offense." Id. at 1278. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Handeen
v. Lemaie, 112 E3d 1339, 1349 (8th Cir. 1997), succinctly posited the quintessential issue
revolving upon the interpretation of Reves: "[the polestar is the activity in question, not the
defendant's status." Handeen, 112 F3d at 1349.
64 See Handeem, 112 F3d at 1349 (refusing to apply Reves, stating "[an attorney's license
is not an invitation to engage in racketeering, and a lawyer no less than anyone else is bound
by generally applicable legislative enactments." The court warned that it would "not shrink
from finding an attorney liable when he crosses the line between the traditional rendition of
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Pinkerton forecloses Reves by its ostensible rule of law, supported by
the RICO Liberal Construction Clause.65 Indeed, Salinas, Beck, and those
federal decisions expansively construing this rule of law, exemplify the
appropriate construction and interpretation of § 1962(d).1
The RICO Liberal Construction Clause and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court further substantiate the justification to invoke and apply
Pinkerton in the civil RICO conspiracy context. Resolution of the conflicting
positions of the federal circuits regarding the appropriate interpretation of
RICO can be achieved through review of the Court's decisions construing
RICO. In its principal RICO decisions, including Salinas v. United States ,67
legal services and active participation in directing the enterprise. The polestar is the activity
in question, not the defendant's status."); Napoli v. United States, 32 F3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1994)
(attorneys who were "of counsel" to the Eisen firm were not merely providing peripheral
advice, but participated in core activities that constituted the affairs of the firm, namely, trying
cases and obtaining settlements; they therefore exercised a significant degree of direction
over the affairs of the enterprise), tert. denied, 513 U.S. I Iuo (1995); Thomas v. Ross & Hardies,
9 E Supp. 2d 547, 554-55 (D. Md. 1998) (outside attorney who played a central active role in
phoney home mortgage scheme was managing or operating the enterprise); Mruz v. Caring,
Inc., 991 E Supp. 701, 719-21 (D. N.J. 1998) (outside attorneys who allegedly orchestrated
efforts of company to conceal Medicaid and tax fraud by systematically intimidating
witnesses); Arons v. Lalime,3 F Supp. 2d 314,322 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (fact that attorney received
a contractual five percent share of profits from allegedly fraudulent scheme is enough to satisfy
Reves test; attorney's time sheet reflected only eight-and-one-half hours of legal work); In re
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealerships Relations Litigation, 958 F. Supp. 1045, 1056-59
(D. Md. 1997) (attorneys who also allegedly counseled witnesses to give evasive or incomplete
testimony, directed American Honda to make false and misleading assertions about the results
of their investigation of the kickback scheme and were in charge of the concealment); In re
American Honda Motor Co. Inc. Dealerships Relations Litigation, 941 E Supp. 528, 559-60
(D. Md. 1996) ("Th[e] cases reveal an underlying distinction between acting in an advisory
professional capacity (even if in a knowingly fraudulent way) and acting as direct participant
in [an enterprise's] affairs." Attorney defendants were paid directors with a full voice on
American Honda; moreover, they allegedly played a direct management role with respect to
policy and procedure for handling the bribery scheme by fielding complaints from dealers who
didn't pay bribes, by handling internal investigations and assisting in concealing the scheme
from discovery); Crowe v. Smith, 848 F. Supp. 1258, 1264-65 (W.D. La. 1994) (lawyer alleged
to be a principal in fraudulent scheme to divest plaintiffs of their land holdings; "his letter-
writing and filing of lawsuits against Crowe were all part and parcel of this scheme"), rev'd on
other grounds, sub nom. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F3d 198 (5th Cir. 1995), and Crowe v. Henry, 115
F3d 294 (5th Cir. 1997); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F Supp. 1076, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(doctor, who aided massive scheme to file false workman's compensation claims by falsely
certifying audio grams he performed, participated in "core activities" of the enterprises), aff'd
sub nom, Tribune Co. v. Abiola, 66 F3d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1995); Lust v. Burke, 876 F Supp. 1474,
1482 (D. Md. 1994) (refusing to dismiss RICO claims against accountant who was allegedly
a principal in several of the fraudulent investment schemes); and, Shuttlesworth v. Hous.
Opportunities Made Equal, 873 E Supp. 1o69, 1075 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (attorneys who allegedly
solicited false sexual harassment complaints against landlord in effort to deprive him of his
rental properties played significant role in enterprise).
65 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 651-52 (1946).
66 Salinas v. Beck, 522 U.S. 52,63-64 (1997); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494,505 (2000).
67 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 52.
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NOW v. Scheidler,6 Alexander v. United States,69 Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp.,70 Tafflin v. Levitt,7' H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,7Z Caplin &Drysdale, Charteredv. United States, 3 UnitedStatesv. Monsanto,
74
Agency Holding Corp., v. Malley-Duff & Assoc.,7" Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.
v. McMahon,76 Sedima, S.PR.L. v. Imrex Co.," Russello v. United States,78 and
Turkette v. United States,79 the Court acknowledged several propositions of
statutory construction, established the basic principles that govern the
interpretation of RICO, and consistently applied them to the statute:
(1) Read the language of the statute;'
(2) Language includes its structure;81
(3) Language should be read in its ordinary or plain meaning, but must be
viewed in context;
8 2
(4) Language should not be read differently in criminal and civil
proceedings;8 3
(5) Look to the legislative history of the statute;8'
(6) Look to the policy of the statute; 5
68 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
69 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
70 Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
71 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
72 H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
73 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
74 United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
75 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
76 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
77 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
78 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
79 Turkette v. United States, 452 U.S. 576 (8981).
80 Natl Org. for Women, 510 U.S. at 249; Holmes, 503 U.S. at 266; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 460;
HI., Inc., 492 U.S. at 237 (citing Russello, 464 U.S. at 20); Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 6o6 (citing
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580); Shearson, 482 U.S. at 227; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 n. 13; Russello, 464
U.S. at 20 (citing Turkette 452 U.S. at 580); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
81 Natlft,. for Women, 5 10 U.S. at 249; Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 15z; Sedima, 473
U.S. at 489-90 n.8, 496 n.14; Russello, 464 U.S. at 22-23; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 58.
82 Hi., Inc., 492 U.S. at 238 (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)); Sedima,
473 U.S. at 495 n.13; Russello, 464 U.S. at 20 (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. 580), 21-23; Turkette, 452
U.S. at 580.
83 Hi., Inc., 492 U.S. at 236 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489); Shearson, 482 U.S. at 239-40;
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489.
84 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 461; Hi., Inc., 492 U.S. at 236-39 (citing
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486,489); Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 613; Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151;
Shearson, 482 U.S. at 238-41; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486,489. Cf. Nat7 Org. for Women, 21o U.S. at
z6 1-62 (requiring clear legislative history to vary the text) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 586,
588-91; Reves, 507 U.S. at 77); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
85 Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 467; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493; Russello, 464 U.S. at 24; Turkette, 452
U.S. at 590.
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(7) The statute was aimed at the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime; 6
(8) The statute is to be broadly read and liberally construed;87 and
(9) Where Congress rejects proposed limiting language in a bill, it may be
presumed that the limitation was not intended.'
These general propositions of statutory construction of the interpretation
of RICO advance the statute's Liberal Construction Clause, § 1964.
Application to those propositions clearly evidence the intent of Congress
to have RICO construed expansively in order to achieve its envisioned
objective of eradicating criminal activity that affects the economic fiber
of American society. RICO basically requires reading the language of the
statute as the most reliable evidence of its intent.8 9 Read literally, the
propositions are uncomplicated and unambiguous.
Finally, if a straightforward textual reading of RICO does not lead to a
finding of criminal and civil accomplice liability and "a clear tie-breaker" is
necessary because "contextual analysis" results in a "tie," then the Liberal
Construction Clause ought to be read to play that role.' Reading the
possibility of accomplice liability or RICO's provision of conspiracy liability
in terms of the maxim expressio unius to exclude accomplice liability or to
create a new, but narrower form of conspiracy liability-either criminally
or civilly-is squarely inconsistent with RICO's Liberal Construction
Clause.91
III. PINKERTON AND RICO CONSPIRACY CONTRASTED
Pinkerton is applied in numerous conspiracy contexts. However, the
doctrine is not necessarily embraced in the civil RICO conspiracy area.
The Supreme Court ruled in Salinas chiefly to expand RICO conspiracy
liability to reach those who facilitate and further the criminal endeavor,
86 Nat'l Org.for Women, 510 U.S. at 429 (citing HJ., Inc., 492 U.S. 242-49); HJ., Inc., 492
U.S. 242-49 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495, 499; Russello, 464 U.S. at
28; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590-91.
87 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 467 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491-92 n.Io,
497-98); HJ., Inc., 492 U.S. at 237; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 609 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491-92
n.1o, 497-98); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491-92 n.1o, 497-98; Russello, 464 U.S. at 21; Turkette, 452
U.S. at 587, 593.
88 Russello, 464 U.S. at 23-24.
89 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593.
90 Reves, 507 U.S. at 189 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 183 (majority opinion) (clause "ensure[s] that Congress's intent is not frustrated
by an overly narrow reading of the statute"); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. C.M. Joinder Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943); (expressio unius gives way to statutory intent and policy);
United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912) (expressio unius is "a rule of construction, not
of substantive law").
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which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a criminal offense.
Salinas cited Pinkerton to support this conclusion. 9
Smith v. Berg93 is an example of the application of Pinkerton through the
tenets of Salinas and Beck. The Third Circuit in Smith v. Berg accorded
liberal construction to Salinas, ruling Reves v. Ernst & Young9 inapplicable
to § 1962(d) claims. RICO conspiracy claims can be maintained against
a non-acting RICO co-conspirator where a plaintiff alleges that any one
RICO co-conspirator engaged in conduct that constitutes "racketeering
activity" resulting in injury. The Third Circuit found that the Supreme
Court in Beck v. Prupis95 did not prohibit this particular pleading approach
under § 1962(d).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
confronted with the incompatible arguments raised by the defendants
regarding Reves and its potential application to RICO conspiracy claims,
and in light of the Beck decision, ruled that the issues were significantly
appropriate for certification before the Third Circuit.' In hearing the case,
the Third Circuit took up the issues of law that concerned the district court
and stated:
This case presents two questions: First, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Salinas v. United States, may liability under the federal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") conspiracy
statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) be limited to those who would, on
successful completion of the scheme, have participated in the operation
or management of a corrupt enterprise? Second, did the Supreme Court's
more recent decision in Beck v. Prupis, limit application of its holding in
Salinas to criminal cases? Ruling against the Appellants on both issues,
we will affirm the Orders of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. In doing so, we hold that any reading of United States v. Antar,
to the effect that conspiracy liability under § 1962(d) extends only to those
who have conspired personally to operate or manage the corrupt enterprise,
or otherwise suggesting that conspiracy liability is limited to those also liable,
on successful completion of the scheme, for a substantive violation under §
1962(c), is inconsistent with the broad application of general conspiracy law
to § 1962(d) as set forth in Salinas.97
In Smith v. Berg, class plaintiffs named three lending institutions and
a title insurance carrier for contravening § 1962(d).9s Those institutional
92 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (997)-
93 Smith v. Berg, 247 E3d 532 (3d Cir. 2oo1).
94 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
95 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2ooo).
96 Smith v. Berg, No. CIV. A. 99-2133, 2000 WL 987867, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2000),
aff'd, 247 F3d 532 (3d Cir. 2001).
97 Smith v. Berg, 247 F3d at 534 (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 534-35.
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defendants were not named for substantively contravening § 1962(c);
rather, the defendants were alleged to have facilitated and furthered the
wrongful activities of John Berg, a real estate developer who selectively
targeted racial and ethnic minorities to qualify to buy distressed residential
properties in the Philadelphia area." The entity defendants argued that
they had not engaged in any conduct constituting racketeering activity"°
and substantially relied upon Third Circuit existing authority expressed
in United States v. Antar 0 to support their assertion. The district court
denied their Rule 12(b)(6) motion"'2 and certified the two specific issues,0 3
identified above for interlocutory appeal in light of Beck v. Prupis.'1
The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that those entities were susceptible
to RICO conspiracy liability notwithstanding the fact that they did
not commit any act that constituted racketeering. The allegations that
those defendants facilitated and furthered Berg's felonious conduct were
sufficient to ascribe conspiratorial liability. The Third Circuit cited Neibel
v. Trans World Assurance Co.'05 as indicative that Reves may apply to RICO
conspiracy; however, Neibefs continued validity was seriously questioned
in light of Smith v. Berg expressly overruling Antar, the case upon which the
Neibel court based its holding. Indeed, other federal courts have severely
criticized the Ninth Circuit's retention of Neibel.
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit, citing Smith v. Bergwith approval, affirmatively
overruled Neibel in United States v. Fernandez,°6 a criminal RICO conspiracy
prosecution. More importantly, the Ninth Circuit recognized Neibel's
legal reasoning rested upon an earlier Third Circuit decision, United States
v. Antar, and that Antar was overruled by Smith v. Berg, which squarely
addressed RICO conspiracy law in light of Salinas and Beck. Affirming the
RICO conspiracy convictions, the Ninth Circuit expressly repudiated and
overruled Neibel and announced recognition of Smith v. Berg as consonant
with, and complementary to, Pinkerton, Salinas and Beck:
We now agree with the Third Circuit that the rationale underlying its
distinction in Antar, and our holding in Neibel, is no longer valid after
the Supreme Court's opinion in Salinas. Accordingly, this case presents
a situation similar to Miller v. Gammie, in which we held that "where the
reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable
with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-judge
99 Id.
IOO Id. at 535
ioi United States v. Antar, 53 E3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).
102 Smith v. Berg, No. CIV. A. 99-2133, 2000 WL 987867, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2000),
aff'd, 247 F3d 532 (3d Cir. zoo).
103 Id. at *3-4.
104 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000).
IO5 Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., io8 E3d I 123 (9th Cir. 1997).
io6 United States v. Fernandez, 388 E3d I I99 (9th Cir. 2004).
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panel should consider itself bound by the later and controlling authority,
and should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively
overruled." We adopt the Third Circuit's Smith test, which retains Reves'
operation or management test in its definition of the underlying substantive
§ 1962(c) violation, but removes any requirement that the defendant have
actually conspired to operate or mange the enterprise herself. Under this
test, a defendant is guilty of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) if the evidence
showed that she "knowingly agree[d] to facilitate a scheme which includes
the operation or management of a RICO enterprise."' 7
The Ninth Circuit's explicit repudiation of Neibel'05 clarified the proper
application and construction of Pinkerton, Salinas, Beck, and Smith v. Beig.
107 Id. (citations omitted).
Io8 Though the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled Neibelon this particular issue of RICO
conspiracy law, the court's opinion is nonetheless significant. Neibel affirmatively adopted the
position that though the judge granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the
RICO § 1962(c) substantive fraud claim, the RICO conspiracy claim could still go to the
jury:
Trans World cites Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, and contends
that since the district court entered a directed verdict on the substantive
claim (§ 1962(c)), then the conspiracy claim (§ 1962(d)) to violate §
1962(c) cannot stand. Yet Religious Technology stands for a wholly different
proposition. In that case, we held that since the plaintiff "failed to allege
the requisite substantive elements of RICO, the conspiracy cause of
action cannot stand." In other words, if the § 1962(c) claim does not
state an action upon which relief could ever be granted, regardless of
the evidence, then the § 1962(d) claim cannot be entertained. That
proposition differs from the facts of this case, where the trial court
granted a directed verdict on the 1962(c) claim due to a lack of evidence.
A lack of evidence may render the substantive claim deficient, but it
does not render it legally impossible.
Neibel, lo8 E3d at 1127 (citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit then established the following postulate governing the resolution of a
civil RICO conspiracy claims in this particular factual evidentiary context:
We have never considered directly whether a civil conspiracy claim can
survive if the substantive claim does not. In United States v. Ohlson, we
held that in a criminal RICO proceeding, the crime of conspiracy could
exist independently of the substantive offense. Since the Ninth Circuit
generally treats criminal and civil RICO claims alike, Changv. Chen, we
hold that a § 1962(d) claim may proceed to a jury despite a directed
verdict on the § I962(c) claim. This holding brings our court in line with
the Seventh Circuit, which allowed a § 1962(c) claim.
Neibel, io8 F3d at 1 127-28 (citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed this position, and recognized and followed Smith v.
Berg, 247 E3d 532 (3d Cir. zoo0), in United States v.Fiander, 547 E3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008)
(dismissed federal RICO conspiracy indictment reinstated, though no RICO substantive
offense count returned within the indictment).
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Relying on the governing case in this circuit on RICO conspiracy, Neibel v.
Trans WorldAssur Co., Schoenberg asserts that she cannot be convicted for
conspiracy to violate RICO if she did not agree to direct the enterprise's
affairs. We conclude thatNeibelis no longer good law because it is inconsistent
with subsequent Supreme Court precedent. Under the appropriate test
outlined in Salinas v. United States, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to support Schoenberg's conviction under § 1962(d) for conspiracy
to violate § 1962(c).1 9
Fernandez advances the principle of Pinkerton by adopting a
comprehensive ruling whose malleable elasticity is consistent with
conspiracy law.'1 0 The ruling is especially congruent with Brenner's"u
treatment of "mediate causation" and its applicability to Pinkerton in the
civil RICO conspiracy context. Smith v. Berg significantly amplifies that
application." l
io9 Fernandez, 388 F3d at 1229.
11o See United States v. Moreland, 509 E3d 1201, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
application of Pinkerton Doctrine sustaining federal money laundering convictions arising
from Ponzi investment scheme).
i i i Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO
Actions, supra note 3, at 953-57, 961-62.
112 The Ninth Circuit's analysis in reversing its prior position in Neibel is especially
noteworthy. Examining RICO conspiracy law, in both criminal and civil contexts, Fernandez
is consonant with Pinkerton and Smith:
Titlei8 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides, in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection
... (c) of this section." In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court
held that liability under § 1962(c), for substantive violations of the
RICO statute, was limited to "those who participate in the operation or
management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity."
After reasoning that "[i]n order to 'participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part in
directing those affairs," the Court cautioned that its adoption of the
'operation or management' test did not mean that liability was limited
to upper management. "An enterprise is 'operated' not just by upper
management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who
are under the direction of upper management."
In Neibel, we adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit in United
States v. Antar in which that court extended Reves' § 1962(c) holding to
conspiracy convictions under § 1962(d), and concluded:
[W]e believe that a distinction can be drawn between, on
the one hand, conspiring to operate or manage an enterprise,
and, on the other, conspiring with someone who is operating
or managing the enterprise. Liability under § 1962(d) would
be permissible under the first scenario, but, without more, not
under the second. Neibel, io8 F3d at 1128.
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A substantial number of federal courts cite and follow Smith v. Berg as
In applying this approach to the insufficient evidence challenge before
it, the Neibel panel concluded: "We agree with the Third Circuit that
to uphold the jury's verdict in this case after Reves, there must have
been substantial evidence that [the defendant] agreed to have some part
in directing [the enterprise's] affairs."
In Salinas, a unanimous decision handed down almost nine months
after Neibel, the Supreme Court held that a sheriff's deputy could
be convicted of conspiracy under § 1962(d) for his role in a scheme
that violated the federal bribery statute even though he neither
committed nor agreed to commit the predicate acts that are required
for a substantive violation of § 1962(c). After outlining "certain well-
established principles" of the law on conspiracies that were equally
applicable to RICO conspiracies, the Court held that "[t]he evidence
showed that [the sheriff] committed at least two acts of racketeering
activity when he accepted numerous bribes and that [the deputy] knew
about and agreed to facilitate the scheme. This is sufficient to support a
conviction under § 1962(d)." The Salinas court did not refer to its earlier
Reves opinion and its adoption of the operation or management test
required to sustain a conviction under § 1962(c), nor did it mention the
Antar-Neibelapproach, which appeared to require more than knowledge
and an agreement to facilitate the enterprise's activities for a § 1962(d)
conviction. The Court did note, however, that "[a] conspirator must
intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of
the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he
adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor." Id.
at 65, 118 S.Ct. 469.
In response, over three years later, the Third Circuit stated
unequivocally:
[Wie hold that any reading of United States v. Antar to the
effect that conspiracy liability under § 1962(d) extends
only to those who have conspired personally to operate or
manage the corrupt enterprise, or otherwise suggesting that
conspiracy liability is limited to those also liable, on successful
completion of the scheme, for a substantive violation under §
1962(c), is inconsistent with the broad application of general
conspiracy law to § 1962(d) as set forth in Salinas. Smith v.
Berg, 247 E3d 532, 534 (3d Cir. zoos).
The Smith panel found that Antar's "novel distinction," upon which
Neibel had relied, "was unnecessary to our holding, as [the opinion]
concluded, in effect, that the defendant met either standard." The
Third Circuit read the Supreme Court's decision in Salinas, upholding
the conspiracy conviction of a defendant who had been acquitted of
substantive RICO violations, as a rejection of the view that a violation
of § 1962(c) was a prerequisite for a violation of § 1962(d). Although it
is unclear whether the Smith panel was dismissing Antar's restrictions
as mere dicta, or concluding that any binding statement of the law had
been vitiated by Salinas, compare id. at 536, with id. at 537, its holding
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both authoritative and as a proper construction and application of Salinas."3
In UnitedStates v. Sasso,"4 the district court found Smith v. Berg appropriately
applied and reached a holding consistent with the Second Circuit's position
expressed in United States v. Zichettello"5 and the Seventh Circuit's analysis
advanced within Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co.,1 6 The court found
that though some of the RICO co-conspirators did not participate directly
within the fraudulent activities of the criminal scheme, those defendants
nonetheless facilitated and furthered the criminal enterprise. Such a
holding is consistent with Salinas and Smith v. Berg."7 Moreover, one court
on § 1962(d)'s requirements is straightforward: "a defendant may be
held liable for conspiracy to violate § 1962(C) if he knowingly agrees
to facilitate a scheme which includes the operation or management of
a RICO enterprise." Id. at 538. After Smith, ours was the only circuit
in which the Reves operation or management test was applied to RICO
conspiracies. See id. at 536 n.8.
Fernandez, 388 F3d at 1228-3o (selected citations omitted).
113 See See Hearns v. Parisi, 548 F. Supp. 2d 132 (M.D. Pa. 2oo8) (Smith v. Berg recognized,
summary judgment denied); Lester v. Percudani, 556 F. Supp. 2d 473, 483 (M.D.Pa. 2oo8)
(Smith v. Berg applied, summary judgment); Loften v. Diolosa, 388 E3d i99, 1228-3o (M.D.
Pa. 2oo8) (Smith v. Berg applied, finding RICO conspiracy allegations sufficiently pleaded
involving predatory lending practices scheme, denying FED. R. Civ. P. iz(b)(6) dismissal
motion); Meeks-Owens v. Indymac Bank, 557 F. Supp. zd 566, 572-73(M.D.Pa. zoo8) (Smith
v. Berg applied, finding RICO conspiracy allegations sufficiently pled for purposes of FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(b); Reves inapplicable to RICO conspiracy pleading and practice); In re Jamuna
Real Estate LLC, 365 B.R. 540, 553 (M.D.Pa. 2007) (Smith v. Berg recognized, FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(a), not FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), applies to RICO conspiracy claim pleading; incorporation by
reference under FED. R. Civ. P. io(c) appropriate; dismissal motion denied); Luzerne County
Ret. Bd v. Makowski, No. CV-03-1803, 2007 WL 4211445 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2007) (Smith
v. Berg recognized; dismissal motion granted for failure to sufficiently plead claim); Darrick
Enter. v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., No. 05-4359, 2007 WL 2893366 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007)
(Smith v. Berg applied, finding RICO conspiracy allegations sufficiently pled for purposes of
FED. R. Civ. P 9(b)); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. o4-5184 and 05-1079, 2007
WL 2892700 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007) (Smith v. Berg recognized; dismissal motion granted for
failure to sufficiently plead claim; leave to amend denied); Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc., v. Iola, No. oo-
6293, 2007 WL 2869309 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2007) (Smith v. Berg recognized, summary judgment
denied); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. o4-5184 and 05-1079, 2007 WL io6298o
(D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2007) (Smith v. Berg recognized, leave to amend RICO claims allowed).
1 14 United States v. Sasso, 230 F Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
115 United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72,99 (2d Cir. zooo).
116 Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 E3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 2000).
117 See Strayer v. Bare, No. 3:o6cv2o68, 2oo8 WL 1924092 (M.D.Pa. 2oo8). Strayer
involved a civil RICO plaintiff alleging injuries proximately caused by the concerted actions
of attorneys and a financial institution in concealing from detection a clandestine, systematic
course of conduct of monetary transfers between themselves that the plaintiff was legally
entitled to receive. As such, these defendants could face prosecution for contravening §
1962(d):
Since a defendant can be part of a conspiracy even when that defendant
does not participate in all of the elements of the conspiracy, both the
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specifically found that a RICO co-conspirator who lacks knowledge of the
entire conspiratorial scheme remains jointly and severally liable for all acts
in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy." 8
The Seventh Circuit later opined in United States v. Warneke"9 that the
Ninth Circuit's'2 0 continued reliance upon Neibel is seriously misplaced,
signaling a significant uneasiness with its unjustified retention. Citing
Brouwer,' the court specifically observed that Smith v. Berg overruled
lawyer-defendants and Wachovia Bank could be liable based on
the facts alleged by plaintiffs. The bank allowed the account to be
established and allowed transfers of money from the trust account to
the IRS, knowingly facilitating a scheme to misappropriate client funds.
Similarly, [the attorneys], whatever the evidence may prove of their
larger responsibility for the scheme, allegedly helped erect the trust
account in question, made sure that client funds went into the account,
and were aware of the misuse of those funds. Accordingly, plaintiffs have
stated a RICO conspiracy claim against all defendants, and we will deny
the motion to dismiss on this point too.
Id. at *7-
118 United States v. Sasso, 23o F. Supp. 2d 275, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
i 9 United States v. Warneke, 31o E3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2002).
i2o The Ninth Circuit's River City Markets v. Fleming Foods West, 960 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.
1992), a RICO conspiracy case, found, practically speaking, that "[wie recognize, however, that
conspiracies rarely are memorialized in writing and often must be proven by circumstantial
evidence." Id. at 1463 (citations omitted). Perforce, the cogent analysis of Smith v. Berg,
premised upon Salinas and Beck, further supports this liberal construction of the RICO
conspiracy statute. Butsee United States v. Fernandez, 388 F3d 1199, 1228-3o (9th Cir. 2004)
(expressly overruling Neibel, adopting and following Smith v. Berg.)
121 Brouwer exemplified the glaring issue confronting the federal courts wrestling with
the proper application of Salinas in the context of Reves and the "participate" and "conduct"
requirements under § 1962(c), and where the two dissimilar judicial tenets blur the line
of proper construction. The Seventh Circuit's cogent analysis constitutes a harbinger of a
prospective construction regarding these tenets:
We suspect that the perception of a conflict between Reves and
Salinas does not arise solely or even primarily over a requirement for
some degree of personal participation in the affairs of the enterprise.
Rather, the conflict is over the level at which personal participation in
the enterprise is required. The conflict is a result of the limitation set
out in Reves as to who can be liable for the substantive offense-not
everyone associated with the enterprise, but only those who somehow
operate or manage the enterprise. How does that square with conspiracy
law? Intuitively, it seems wrong that a person could conspire to violate
a law which does not apply to him. The problem can be illustrated by
contrasting a RICO conspiracy to violate subsection (c) with a more
familiar conspiracy-say one to distribute narcotics. To oversimplify, in
a drug distribution conspiracy, a street seller can be a member of the
conspiracy if he agrees with the goal of the conspiracy-to distribute
drugs. The underlying statute which he is conspiring to violate makes it
unlawful for "any person knowingly or intentionally (i) to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense.. a controlled substance[.]" The law makes clear
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Antar, and that the Ninth Circuit's misguidance through further retention
of Antar was diametrically inapposite with the prevailing position of federal
courts addressing Salinas:
Neibel is an unsatisfactory decision. It assumes that only a person who has
committed the substantive crime can be guilty of conspiracy and then holds
that this principle applies to RICO [, too. Yet there is no such principle.
. Nothing in Neibel persuades us to change course. Indeed, the [N]inth
[C]ircuit seems not to have recognized that it was going against the
Supreme Court's view of what is necessary to prove a criminal conspiracy
... [T]he [Tihird [C]ircuit has disavowed the passage [of] Antar to which
Neibelreferred, and disagreed with Neibel's holding[,] too. Every other circuit
that has considered this subject likewise has disapproved Neibel. We shall
stick with Brouwer.'
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
the government's summary judgment motion in United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc.,"23 specifically finding that a RICO co-conspirator's liability does
not require the defendant to participate in the operation or management
of the RICO enterprise. Roundly criticizing Neibel as judicially inapposite
and inexplicably misplaced, the court found that:
All circuits but the Ninth have concluded that Reves addressed only the
extent of conduct or participation necessary to violate § 1962(c), and did
not address the principles of conspiracy law under § 1962(d). Thus, Reves'
"operation or management" standard applies only to substantive RICO
offenses under § 1962(c) and not to a conspiracy to violate RICO under §
1962(d). 124
that any person who conspires to commit a drug offense is subject to the
same penalties as a person who violates the substantive provision. In
other words, § 841 does not apply only to those persons who "participate,
directly or indirectly, in the control" of the distribution network. If it
did, would we confidently say that a street seller could be a conspirator?
In contrast, the limitation on the universe of people that subsection (c)
of § 1962 applies to is what makes a conspiracy to violate that section
conceptually difficult. It is a conspiracy to violate a very specific statute
which only applies to those meet the operation of or management of
Reves.
Brouwer, 199 F3d at 966 (citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the RICO conspiracy issue involving contravention of §
1962(c), juxtaposed with the federal drug distribution conspiracy law, is proper. The decision
correctly recognizes the judicial limitation of Reves and the appropriate application of Salinas.
Indeed, the court opined that it previously ruled that a RICO conspirator need not be an
operator or manager of a RICO enterprise in the § 1962(c) context. Brouwer similarly advances
that logic in light of Salinas. Id. at 967.
izz Warneke, 31o F3d at 547-48 (citations omitted).
123 United States v, Phillips Morris USA, Inc., 327 E Supp. zd 13, 18-20 (D.D.C. 2004).
124 Id. at 19 (citations omitted). See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F3d 1199, 1230
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Without question, Pinkerton supports the underlying tenets of the RICO
Liberal Construction Clause."' Pinkerton's rational logic substantiates its
practical application to civil RICO conspiracy litigation. 1 6
(9th Cir. 2004) (discussed supra note I12, expressly overruling Neibel, finding Smith v. Berg
determinative and dispositive in affirming RICO criminal conspiracy convictions, and that the
Ninth Circuit's continued retention and application of Neibel legally infirm inasmuch as Neibel
cited and followed United States v. Antar, overruled by Smith v. Berg).
125 For example, a § 1962(d) conspiracy to aid and abet RICO substantive contraventions
under § 1962(a), (b), and (c) is recognized as a matter of law. See United States v. Bosch,
914 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cit. 199o) (conspiracy to aid and abet cocaine distribution); United
States v. Frink, 912 E2d 1413, 1416 (I lth Cir. 1990) (conspiracy to aid and abet possession
of a controlled substance). One can be convicted of conspiracy to aid and abet a substantive
offense and aiding and abetting commission of that substantive offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
See United States v. Huber, 772 F2d 585, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1985).
126 One federal court severely criticized a litigant's attempt to invoke Pinkerton in the
civil RICO conspiracy context. The court found a civil claimant's argument to apply the
Pinkerton Doctrine to a civil RICO conspiracy claim both unfounded and unwarranted. See
Bldg. Indus. Fund v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 992 F. Supp.
162 (E.D.N.Y 1996). In Building Industry Fund, the district court commented derisively about
such a contention:
Plaintiff's attempts to link the associations and JIB to these incidents
all depend on a novel and unwarranted extension of the concept of
conspiracy liability under Pinkerton v. United States. Plaintiffs contend
that, because all defendants are engaged in a "conspiracy," the
substantive acts of one defendant can be "imputed" to each of the other
defendants. They cite several cases which note that, under New York
law, proof of a civil conspiracy subjects exposes a defendant to joint and
several liability for the actions of co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy. That does not mean, however, that predicate acts of one
defendant can be attributed to another defendant for the purpose of
establishing liability under RICO merely by alleging a "conspiracy."
Indeed, such a rule would be contrary to the express statutory language
of § 1962(a), which limits liability to those defendants who participate in
racketeering activity as a principal within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2.
That provision reads as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
In the absence of any indication that AECI, NYECA or JIB in any
way aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured
or otherwise caused the commission of the various racketeering acts
identified by plaintiffs, the court concludes that no genuine issue of
material fact exists which precludes summary judgment for these
defendants on plaintiffs'1962(a)claim.
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IV. PINKERTON APPLIED IN FEDERAL TOBACCO LITIGATION
Tobacco litigation has seized the conscience of the nation. Health
concerns and monetary recompense issues predominate the day. As such,
RICO has found yet another area for practitioners to advance its application
of the Pinkerton Doctrine. Two significant RICO opinions interpreting and
applying Pinkerton warrant discussion.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered
its Final Opinion in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.," 7 a complex
federal RICO civil action brought by the federal government against
tobacco companies and related entities. The court ruled that the defendants
contravened § 1962(c) and § 1962(d). 8
Finding that each defendant had individually agreed to commit at least
two forms of racketeering activity,' 19 and that each defendant had agreed
to participate in the conduct of the RICO enterprise with the knowledge
and intent that other members of the conspiracy would also commit at least
two racketeering acts in furtherance of the enterprise, 3 ° the court cited and
followed with approval the Pinkerton Doctrine.31 The court reasoned the
application cogently and succinctly:
In addition, even if one conspirator did not participate in, or was unaware
of, acts undertaken by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, it
is nevertheless liable for such acts, including those that occur prior to its
joining the conspiracy. 3
The court concluded (1) that the evidence clearly established that
defendants' conspiracy was in existence as of December 1953, when
several of the cigarette company defendants met in New York City to
create the Committee on Tobacco Research and to discuss and outline the
enterprise's future strategy;13  (2) that each defendant agreed to commit a
RICO substantive offense with the knowledge that other members of the
enterprise were also conspiring to commit racketeering activity;'M and (3)
that all defendants coordinated significant aspects of their public relations,
Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
In light of Salinas, Beck, and Smith v. Berg, the outcome of Building Industry Fund may have
produced a different result; however, the district court dismissed the RICO action based upon
the absence of the plaintiffs' requisite standing. Id. at 172.
127 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 E Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2oo6).
128 Id. at 9o.
129 Id. at 902-906.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 9oz.
132 Id. (citations omitted).
133 Id. at 904-905.
134 Id.
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scientific, legal, and marketing activity in furtherance of the common
objective: to use mail and wire transmissions to maximize industry profits
by preserving and expanding the market for cigarettes through a scheme to
deceive the public.13
The court also found that each defendant agreed to facilitate the
substantive RICO offenses by concealing or suppressing information
and documents which may have been detrimental to the interests of the
members of the enterprise: 3 6
Thus, each Defendant knew the goals of the Enterprise, the general nature
of the conspiracy, and that other members of the conspiracy would commit
at least two Racketeering Acts in furtherance of the Enterprise's scheme
to defraud. Indeed, each defendant took substantial steps to facilitate the
scheme to defraud that was the central purpose of the conspiracy, including
committing numerous Racketeering Acts in furtherance of the Enterprise's
affairs. Hence, each Defendant entered into the requisite conspiratorial
agreement. 137
The court similarly concluded that the government did not have to
establish that each conspirator explicitly agreed with every other conspirator
to commit the substantive RICO offenses, or knew his fellow co-
conspirators, or was aware of all of the details of the conspiracy. Addressing
the knowledge component, the court found that it was only required that
the defendant "know the general nature of the conspiracy and that the
conspiracy extends beyond his individual role." 138 For all these reasons,
the court concluded that the defendants were liable for RICO conspiracy
because they both explicitly and implicitly agreed to violate § 1962(c). 39
Philip Morris illustrates that Pinkerton is an effective, malleable
instrument appropriately suited for application to civil RICO conspiracy
litigation. The cogent analysis reflected within the Full Opinion similarly
connotes that the concept of mediate causation, discussed earlier, lends
support to the logical fusion of that concept to Pinkerton, i.e., the "bad
act" of agreeing with others, is sufficient to support the application of the
Pinkerton Doctrine to civil RICO conspiracy litigation.
The Untied States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York denied summary judgment motions on class plaintiffs' RICO claims
135 Id. at 904.
136 Id. at 905-906.
137 Id. at 905. AccordSalinas, 522 U.S. at 66 ("[E]ven if Salinas did not accept or agree to
accept two bribes, there was ample evidence that he conspired to violate subsection (c). The
evidence showed that [Salinas' conspiratori committed at least two acts of racketeering activity
when he accepted numerous bribes and that Salinas knew about and agreed to facilitate the
scheme. This is sufficient to support a conviction under § 1962(d).").
138 Philip Morris USA, Inc. 449 E Supp. 2d at 905.
139 Id. at 906.
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in Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 11° Schwab is another federal RICO
class action instituted against the tobacco industry. Addressing the RICO
conspiracy claims, District Judge Jack B. Weinstein cited and followed
Smith v. Berg in finding the existence of triable issues of material fact,
and that Second Circuit case law construing Salinas and Beck was further
substantiated by Smith v. Berg.
The holdings of several circuits on a related issue-whether the reach of the
RICO conspiracy statute is limited to those who would have participated
in the operation or management of an enterprise-reaffirm the application
of Salinas to civil cases. In light of Salinas, the Third Circuit held that a
civil defendant may be held liable for conspiracy to violate § 1962(d) if he
knowingly agrees to facilitate a scheme which includes the operation or
management of a RICO enterprise. The court overruled its prior holding
in United States v. Antar which limited conspiracy liability to those who
had conspired personally to operate or manage the corrupt enterprise. The
court explicitly rejected defendants' contention that Beck limited Salinas to
criminal cases.
141
Schwab correctly observed that Smith v. Berg accurately construed Beck
in a manner that "actually limits the class of plaintiffs whose injuries are
cognizable; it does not in any way limit the class of defendants who are
liable."' 14 1 Moreover, the district court noted that the Second Circuit had
consistently ruled as to the proper construction and interpretation of Salinas
and Beck, which accurately reflects the application of Pinkerton, Salinas, and
Smith v. Berg. 141
140 Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. zd. 992, 1038-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2oo6)
(citing and following Smith v. Beg RICO conspiracy analysis, denying dismissal motion).
141 Id. at 1038 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Fernandez, 388 F3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2004) (overruling Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., io8 F3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1997),
on the same grounds). Smith held that its prior holding in Antar was inconsistent with "the
plain implication of the standard set forth in Salinas ... that one who opts into or participates
in a conspiracy is liable for the acts of his co-conspirators which violate § 1962(c) even if the
defendant did not personally agree to do, or conspire with respect to, any particular element."
Smith, 247 F3d at 537.
142 Schwab, 449 ESupp.zd at 1037.
143 Id. at 1038. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CPT Med. Serv., PC., 375 E Supp.
2d 141, 150-51 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that plaintiff's allegation that defendants provided
"support" in furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity was sufficient under [§1 1962(d),
even if plaintiff did not allege that defendants committed two predicate acts themselves);
Davis Lee Pharmacy, Inc. v. Manhattan Cent. Capital Corp., 327 F. Supp. 2d I59, 163-64
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("A plaintiff.., must prove an agreement by each defendant to commit at
least two predicate acts," but "[tihe conspirator need not have agreed to commit the two or
more predicate acts himself"); Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F3d 366,376-77 (znd Cir. 2003) ("[in the
civil context, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant knew about and agreed to facilitate the
scheme"); Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., No. 02-CIV-8074, 2004 WL 221165o, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2004) ("lilt is possible to violate § 1962(d) by conspiring with others, even without
committing or agreeing to commit any predicate acts oneself").
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CONCLUSION
The Pinkerton Doctrine isjusticiably appropriate to, and commensurately
supportive of, civil RICO conspiracy litigation. Pinkerton, which imputes
co-conspiratorial liability for substantive crimes committed by other
confederates of a conspiracy, can successfully be employed as an effective
instrument to encourage and allow civil RICO plaintiffs to hold "deep
pocket" parties liable for RICO contraventions.144
Judicially fusing Pinkerton with civil complicity emboldens litigants to
obtain redress from those who agree to commit RICO offenses, as well as
from those who actually perpetrate them. This fusion of postulates will
generate two results. One result is that offenders, especially corporate and
other artificial entities will not be able to immunize or insulate themselves
from RICO co-conspiratorial liability by interposing their agents to commit
acts that they have sanctioned. The other result is that those who have
been injured by RICO-violative conduct can pursue redress from all who
contributed to its commission. This advances both the policies of making
victims of such activity whole and of ensuring that its beneficiaries suffer
for the consequences of their unlawful actions.
141
The most difficult part of employing the Pinkerton Doctrine is pleading
conspiracy' 46 with the specificity required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 47  For civil RICO litigants who can satisfy this burden,
144 Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in
Civil RICO Actions, supra note 3, at 42 1.
145 G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 265-8o (1982).
146 Pleadingconsiderations also reveal that a conspiracy to aid and abet a RICO substantive
offense is recognized. The Ninth Circuit recognized a conspiracy to aid and abet a substantive
offense in a RICO/drug conspiracy criminal prosecution. United States v. Shryock, 342 E3d
948, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2003). Notably significant is that Shryock is a federal RICO prosecution
related to Fernandez, 388 E3d at 1 I99 (overruling Neibel, 1o8 F3d at 1123, adopting Smith v.
Berg, 247 E3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001)). Another pleading consideration is advancing Pinkerton in
the context of aiding and abetting a RICO conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit recognized aiding
and abetting of a RICO conspiracy in the federal drug conspiracy context. See United States
v. Gonzalez, 933 E zd 417, 44Z-45 (7th Cir.1991) (Pinkerton Doctrine analyzed in conjunction
with aiding and abetting) (citing United States v. Galiffa, 734 F2d 306,310-11 (7th Cir. 1984)
(aiding and abetting a conspiracy)).
147 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Federal courts disagree whether RICO conspiracy pleading is
governed by Rule 9(b). See In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Sec.
Litig., 682 F. Supp. 1073, io8o (C.D. Cal. 1987) (RICO conspiracy pleading not subject to
Rule 9(b)). See also In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Sec. Litig.,
636 F. Supp. 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (same); compare At. Gypsum Co., v. Lloyds Int'l Corp.,
753 F Supp. 505, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 199 o ) (Rule 9(b) applies to RICO conspiracy pleading)
with In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y 199o) (RICO conspiracy
pleading not subject to Rule 9(b)); Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 E2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) (RICO
conspiracy pleading governed by Rule 9(b)). But see II CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1251.1, n.14 (2d ed. 1987) (conspiracy claims
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the Pinkerton Doctrine is an effective instrument for imposing RICO
conspiratorial liability upon parties who might otherwise avoid such
ascription. 4 '
No rational justification precludes application of the Pinkerton Doctrine
to civil RICO conspiracy litigation. As stated at the introduction of this
not subject to Rule 9(b) (see cases identified therein). See Wilson v. Toussie, 260 E Supp. 2d
530, 536 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (court declined to dismiss home buyers' RICO conspiracy claim
premised upon grounds the claim was not pleaded with Rule 9(b) sufficient particularity;
Rule 8(a) applies to RICO conspiracy claim); and Toto v. McMahon, Brafman, Morgan &
Co., No. 93 Civ 5894, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 1399, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1995) (court explicitly
and succinctly stated that a RICO § 1962(d) conspiracy claim does not have to meet the
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) pleading strictures). See Swierkiwicz v. Soreman, 534 U.S. 506, 511-12
(2002) (rejecting a widely applied, heightened pleading burden that several federal circuits
had theretofore imposed upon plaintiffs to plead sufficient facts to justify an inference of
discrimination). According to Swierkiwicz, Rule 8 forbids imposing such pleading burdens in
favor of a simplified notice pleading standard:
Th[e] simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery
rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and
issues, and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. The provisions for
discovery are so flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and
summary judgment motions so effective, that attempted surprise in
federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues detected, and the
gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the inspection
of the court.
Swierkiwicz, 534 U.S. at 512, quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1202 (2d ed. 1987).
Federal courts have applied the reasoning of Swierkiwicz to reject requests to impose a
heightened pleading requirement upon RICO pleadings. See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301
F3d 1163, i168 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying "generous notice pleading standard" to allegation
of RICO injury). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held in In re Glenfed, Inc., Sec. Litig., 42 F3d
1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane), that Rule 9(b) requires particularity only as to circumstances
constituting fraud, and not defendant's scienter. Id. at 1545-46 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)). The court held
that imposition of such a requirement was a task for Congress and the various legislative and
judicial bodies involved in the Rule amendments.
148 But see Bell At. Corp .v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 554 (2007), wherein the U. S. Supreme
Court clarified that FED. R. Clv. P. 8's pleading requirements impose a burden of pleading facts
upon a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy. In Twombley, an antitrust class action complaint broadly
alleged a conspiracy to fix telephone service charges to monopolize telecommunications
markets based largely upon allegations of parallel business conduct coupled with "merely
legal conclusions" about an alleged conspiratorial agreement. Expressly overruling the
landmark pleading sufficiency standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court in
Twombley held that Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to allege sufficient plausible facts to justify an
"entitlement to relief." Twombley, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66 (citations omitted). In other words, a
plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at
1974. The Twombley opinion will attract considerable judicial attention and adjustment as to
the proper gatekeeping role of courts at the pleading stage, especially in conspiracy cases. See
also Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in Civil
RICO Actions, supra note 3, at 10 12-13.
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Article, Pinkerton advances the underpinnings of the RICO Liberal
Construction Clause, and its progeny-Salinas and Beck-support that
application.1 49 And, the concepts of "affiliative liability' ' 50 and "mediate
causation" 151 further support that judicially correct result. Indeed, Pinkerton
appropriately melds the underpinnings of the RICO Liberal Construction
Clause through realistic and pragmatic application to address a myriad of
intricate and technically complex factual paradigms that engender the
assertion of civil RICO conspiracy claims.
51
149 Indeed, a perusal of the Honourable Harold A. Ackerman's scholarly exposition and
erudite analysis of Pinkerton in United States v. Local 560 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
581 F. Supp. 279 (D.C.N.J. 1984), exemplifies the judicially correct analysis of RICO conspiracy
law, presaging Salinas and Beck:
At common law, too, one who was a co-conspirator, as an independent
basis for criminal responsibility, was vicariously and substantively liable
for reasonably foreseeable offenses committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. I, therefore, concluded that a RICO "Enterprise" conspiracy
may be established without personal conduct amounting to two personal
offenses. Instead, it is sufficient if the government demonstrates that
agreement through the defendant's aiding and abetting in at least two
such offenses, or through assent to the commission by someone else or
several others of at least two such offenses.
Id. at 331-32.
15o Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in
Civil RICO Actions, supra note 3, at 963-64.
151 Id. at 974-75, nn.i89-i9o.
152 See Deutsche Int'l i, LLC v. El Trade Int'l Establishment, No. CVo3-1663, 2004 WL
5642432 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2004) (FED. R. Civ. P. i2(b)(6) dismissal motion denied; Pinkertonl
Smith v. Berg based RICO conspiracy premised claim sustained; district court specifically ruled
that RICO § 1962(d) claim sufficiently pleaded in conformity with FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and
Ninth Circuit authority under Blake v. Dierdorif, 856 E2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cit. 1988) (aiding and
abetting and conspiracy charges under RICO); RICO plaintiff pleaded § 1962(d), contending
that Pinkerton applied, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff did not plead a § 1962(c) claim
against moving defendants). See also Brunswick Corp., Mercury Marine Div., v. E.A. Doyle Mfg.
Co., 770 F Supp. 1351, 1372 (E.D.Wis. 1991). The Brunswick court recognized application of
Pinkerton in a civil RICO conspiracy jury instruction:
Even if an individual defendant could have proven he never used the
mail or wire communications, a conspirator is responsible for offenses
committed by his fellow conspirators.
Id. at 1372.
The jury in these cases unanimously found each defendant was a member of the
conspiracy. Id.
See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. 04-5184 & 05-1079, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25632 (D. N.J. Apr. 5 2007) (Smith v. Berg applied; RICO conspiracy claim dismissed with
leave to amend); Johnson Controls, Inc., v. Exide Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 654 (N.D.III. zoo)
(Pinkerton recognized in footnote 9 as applicable to general conspiracy analysis).
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